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CAN YOU SEE AND HEAR US, MS. SMITH?:
PROTECTING DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN USING AUDIO AND VIDEO
CONFERENCING IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
IVAYLO VALCHEV*
As new technology is developed and older technology upgraded, people
find new efficiency and flexibility in virtually every aspect of their personal
and professional lives. The judiciary and broader legal profession have
found the influx of technology just as useful as other professions. However,
as new technology continues to reshape the practice of law, we must be
cognizant of its effect on judicial proceedings and vigilant in protecting basic
Constitutional guarantees, especially for criminal defendants. While the
twenty-first-century courtroom is wired to bring efficiency and flexibility to
the practice of law, the very core of the judicial process is not modern
displays but a document ratified in 1788. This Comment discusses how one
emerging technology—audio and video conferencing—poses a risk to the
right to effective assistance of counsel. The Comment advances three main
arguments. First, the use of audio and video conferencing makes it more
difficult for a criminal defendant to confront state witnesses. Second, the
extent to which audio and video conferencing negatively impacts the right to
effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the type of judicial
proceeding. Lastly, the current constitutional tests for finding ineffective
assistance of counsel are inadequate in cases where audio and video
conferencing may be used.

* Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, JD 2020. Foremost, I would like to thank Nadia
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writing of this comment, my parents for their many sacrifices that made my legal education a
possibility in the first place, my sister Zorie for all of the pep talks, all of the educators
throughout my life that improved my writing, the courtroom staff in Springfield, IL that
inspired this comment, and the journal staff that worked on this comment.
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INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first-century courtroom has little resemblance to its
predecessors. While judges, attorneys, defendants, and an assortment of
courtroom officials remain as fixtures of the administration of justice,
technology has ushered a revolution in the practice of law. In 1998, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts piloted a program that
would introduce more technology into federal courts. 1 The program
specifically sought to install “monitors, document cameras, videoconferencing capabilities, and internet connections.” 2 The program was an
early effort to revolutionize courts, and despite funding limitations that

1
Deborah D. Kuchler & Leslie C. O’Toole, How Technological Advances in the
Courtroom Are Changing the Way We Litigate, FED’N OF DEF. & CORP. COUNSEL Q., Winter
2008, at 205, http://kuchlerpolk.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/how_technological_advan
ces_in_the_courtroom_are_changingddk.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKQ5-KPCS].
2
Id. at 205–06.
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followed, many federal and state courtrooms now include upgraded
technology. 3
Technological improvements to courtrooms have focused on updating
technology used for presenting evidence. 4 These changes have primarily
replaced antiquated techniques of presenting evidence to judges and jurors.5
Whereas whiteboards or chalkboards, hard copies of documents and
photographs, poster boards, and the like were staples of courtrooms before
the concerted effort to introduce technology into the courtroom, devices have
now replaced many of these functions. 6 An entirely wired courtroom easily
includes monitor or screen displays next to the judge, counsels’ tables, the
jury box, court reporter, deputy, and hanging from the ceiling for the public
to view. 7 Other than viewing displays, the technological upgrades have
included: annotation monitors allowing witnesses to directly mark exhibits;
evidence cameras which allow attorneys to ensure that evidence is easily
viewed and displayed; various inputs and outputs allowing for the use of
more technology; integrated controls so that judges and courtroom officials
can control the displayed content; and video and audio conferencing
capabilities that allow for remote appearances.8
Audio and video conferencing, 9 in particular, has expanded the
communication reach of modern courts. This technology allows individuals
to communicate with each other remotely by both hearing and seeing each
other. 10 Because of its visual and auditory functions, video conferencing is
3

See id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
5
Id.; see also Jess Scherman, How Courtroom Technology Has Revolutionized Criminal
Cases, RASMUSSEN C.: JUST. STUD. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.rasmussen.edu/degre
es/justice-studies/blog/courtroom-technology-revolutionized-criminal-cases/ [https://perma.c
c/MN4Z-AF9C].
6
See Scherman, supra note 5; see also Kuchler & O’Toole, supra note 1, at 207–08.
7
Kuchler & O’Toole, supra note 1, at 207.
8
Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., The Basics of a Technology-Enhanced Courtroom, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2017) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_jour
nal/2017/fall/basics-technologyenhanced-courtroom/ [https://perma.cc/9HMU-WH4L].
9
Throughout this Comment, I use “audio and video conferencing” (or “video or audio
conferencing”) and “remote appearances” interchangeably.
10
CTR. FOR LEGAL & COURT TECH., BEST PRAC. FOR USING VIDEO TELECONFERENCING
FOR HEARINGS AND RELATED PROC. 25 (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/file
s/documents/Draft_Best%2520Practices%2520Video%2520Hearings_10-09-14_1.pdf [https
://perma.cc/539E-FSZ4]. The report cited here is a draft report. The draft was intended for use
by The Administrative Conference of the United States’ Committee on Adjudication. The
Author cites to the draft version of the report, as opposed to the final version, because the draft
version contained a more comprehensive overview of the relevant subject matter. The final
version was published on December 5, 2014.
4
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superior to technology that only uses audio conferencing because it allows
individuals to observe the other participants’ facial expressions and physical
movements, which naturally improves communication. 11 While video
conferencing is superior to audio conferencing, both present similar legal
problems. In this Comment, their impact on the judicial process will be
analyzed simultaneously because the crucial distinction between a remote
and physical appearance is not the specific characteristics of the mode of
remote appearance—whether it is audio or video—but instead the fact that
there is a remote appearance.
Inherent in the overall increased reliance on technology in the
courtroom is efficiency. The use of video and audio conferencing has unique
benefits. For one, the legal community widely accepts the premise that
conferencing via audio and video leads to substantial financial savings.12
These savings are mainly due to a reduction of travel costs for both the
attorneys and defendants, especially in cases of incarcerated defendants.13
Moreover, video conferencing is widely believed to result in reduced travel
time, more efficient use of judges’ time, scheduling flexibility, and better
accommodations for participants who are ill or cannot travel. 14 This not only
improves convenience but also has the potential to create efficiencies in
courtroom proceedings.
The effects of using video conferencing are not always a net positive.
Any technology brings a risk for technical problems, and video conferencing
is no different. Some of the technical problems associated with the use of
video and audio conferencing technology include: initial connectivity,
dropped calls or video, not being able to see or hear the participant, and audio
or video delays. 15 As alluded to above, courts have financial limitations in
updating courtroom technology. The actual cost of installing a system
capable of delivering the type of performance required for a judicial setting
can be as high as $200,000. 16 Courts must determine whether the initial cost
is worth any future financial savings. 17 Given the substantial increase in the
use of this technology, it appears that some courts have found that having
video conferencing capabilities is a beneficial cost.
The uses of this technology have real effects on the judicial system, and
it is only prudent to consider these effects as the judicial system continues to
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62–63.
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embrace technology in the courtroom. 18 Nothing is at higher risk than the
constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel.
While
technological capability will likely only increase and improve in the future,
the consequences of its use in the judicial process are still not fully
understood or tested as they apply to the decision-making process of judges
and jurors. 19 The effect on the adversarial process of the judicial system is
an extension of that concern. 20 Broadly, this Comment aims to explore how
the use of audio and video conferencing in courts affects the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
In the “Background” section, this Comment introduces the right to
counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel. The following
section examines the Supreme Court case, Wright v. Van Patten, and its
consideration of how remote appearances affect a defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel. Next, the Comment introduces three
arguments about the use of video and audio conferencing and its effects on
the effective assistance of counsel. First, it considers the effect of video and
audio conferencing on the Confrontation Clause within the context of remote
appearances. Next, it explores how different judicial proceedings create
more or less favorable conditions for the use of remote appearances by
considering the impact on critical stages of the judicial process. Lastly, it
argues that current tests for determining ineffective assistance of counsel are
inadequate for future uses of technology and also proposes an alternative test.
This Comment concludes with a final observation on the topic of the use of
remote appearance technology in courts.
I. BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, [a defendant] shall enjoy the right to . . . have
Assistance of Counsel for [her] defense.” 21 The right to assistance of counsel
is not an independent right but instead works in tandem with other Sixth
Amendment guarantees 22 to achieve the Amendment’s overall goal of a fair
trial. Without the education, knowledge, skills, and expertise counsel
18
Id. at 23; see also Siri Carpenter, Technology Gets Its Day in Court AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N. (Oct. 2001), https://www.apa.org/monitor/oct01/technology [https://perma.cc/UN8GBUW8].
19
See Carpenter, supra note 18.
20
Id.
21
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22
The Sixth Amendment recognizes that a defendant has the right to a speedy and public
trial, an impartial jury of her peers, to be informed of the charges against her, to be confronted
by witnesses testifying against her, and to compel witnesses to testify on her behalf. Id.
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provides when representing a defendant, the adversarial process envisioned
by the Amendment would falter. 23 Thus, the guarantees in the Sixth
Amendment are critically dependent on the assurance that a defendant has
counsel to represent her in criminal prosecutions, making the right to counsel
indispensable.
A. THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

While the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of
Rights, the Supreme Court did not begin to define the scope of its protections
adequately until the twentieth century. Courts mostly believed that the right
embedded in the Sixth Amendment was a “declaration of the [defendant’s]
right to counsel,” and not “a duty on the part of the United States to provide
it.” 24 The Court’s recognition that indigent defendants were entitled to an
appointed counsel profoundly underscored the importance of counsel in a
trial and also created a duty on the part of the government to provide counsel.
In the 1938 decision Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that an indigent federal
defendant had the right to court-appointed counsel. 25 The Zerbst Court
reasoned that the right to assistance of counsel was “one of the safeguards of
the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to ensure fundamental human right
of life and liberty.” 26 The Court recognized that without counsel defending
her client, a skilled prosecutor could present a case without any challenge on
the merits of the presented theory, the introduced evidence, or, more
generally, the knowledge to navigate the judicial process. 27
In 1963, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right to
assistance of counsel to indigent defendants in state felony cases. 28 It
recognized that the right to assistance of counsel is fundamental to the
guarantee of a fair trial and, as such, it must apply to the states. 29 Without
counsel representing a defendant, there would be little assurance that the
envisioned adversarial process in a fair trial would be possible. 30 The Court
was particularly concerned about the imbalance between the prosecution and

23

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
John Donohue, Effective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal: Due Process Prevails in
Evitts v. Lucey, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 185, 187 (1985).
25
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468–69 (1938).
26
Id. at 462.
27
See id. at 462–63.
28
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
29
See id. at 344.
30
See id.
24
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the defense if the defendant was not guaranteed representation. 31 The
concern was that the prosecution could always be assumed to have sufficient
funds to fulfill its societal public safety role, but defendants could not always
be guaranteed representation if only defendants with sufficient funds were
able to acquire representation. 32 The equity of having counsel represent both
indigent defendants and those defendants who can afford to hire counsel is a
fundamental tenet of the Court’s emphasis that “every defendant stands equal
before the law.” 33
B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

The first mention of effective assistance of counsel is embedded in the
Powell v. Alabama 34 decision. The Court recognized that in some criminal
proceedings, 35 trial courts must appoint effective counsel to represent
defendants that neither could afford to hire counsel nor had the intellectual
ability to present a defense by themselves. 36 Notably, the Court reasoned
that the mere appointment of counsel did not remove the guarantee of counsel
if counsel could not effectively discharge her duty to prepare and try a case. 37
For example, appointing counsel immediately before a trial begins without
giving her the opportunity to investigative the pertinent facts, or appointing
counsel that simply chooses not to investigate the pertinent facts, does not
satisfy the right to assistance of counsel. Accordingly, “the right to counsel
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” 38 “[I]f the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and . . . judges should strive to
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
31

See id.
See id.
33
See id.
34
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35
The Court was particularly concerned with cases where the life of the defendant is at
stake. Additionally, the factual circumstances of the Powell case lended themselves to
recognizing that defendants needed—and were guaranteed—counsel during their trial. “[T]he
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility,
the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact
that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them
necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives—we think the
failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a
clear denial of due process.” Id. at 71.
36
See id. at 71–73.
37
See id. at 71.
38
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85, 90 (1955)); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69 (1942); Avery v. Alabama 308
U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
32
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defendants in criminal cases in their cases.” 39 The right to effective
assistance of counsel derives from the right to counsel itself; if a defendant
is not constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed counsel, she cannot be
guaranteed effective assistance of counsel. 40
C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL IN AUDIO AND VIDEO
CONFERENCING

While the Supreme Court has not examined a case regarding effective
assistance of counsel in audio and video conferencing on the merits, in 2007,
the Court granted certiorari in Wright v. Van Patten, 41 which examined the
issue under the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). Given the procedural posture of the case and the resulting
opinions in state and federal courts that form the primary review of the issue,
a brief background of the mechanics of AEDPA actions is valuable for
understanding the relevant case law presented later in this Comment.
Under AEDPA, a state court claim cannot be overturned by a federal
court “unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 42
The Court held that under AEDPA claims, “an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” 43
Therefore, using an objective test, a federal court must find that a state court’s
interpretation of the federal law was objectively unreasonable to justify
overturning the decision of the state court. 44 Significantly, in the Van Patten
case, the Court found that the state court, reviewing Van Patten’s claim,
reasonably interpreted the federal law available to them.45
In Van Patten, the Court considered whether the state or federal court
applied the correct test to determine whether the representation of counsel
was ineffective and thus required a remedy. The Court applied one of two
tests. The test devised in Strickland v. Washington is a test for actual,
subjective ineffectiveness, and the test in United States v. Cronic is per se, or
objective, ineffectiveness. In Van Patten, the Court examined the opinions

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1987).
552 U.S. 120 (2008).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(d)(1) (2012).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S 362, 410 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 120.
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of the Seventh Circuit, which applied the Cronic test, and the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, which applied the Strickland test. 46
1. Van Patten Background
Joseph Van Patten was charged with first-degree intentional homicide
under Wisconsin law. 47 He avoided a trial and a likely conviction for firstdegree intentional homicide by pleading guilty to first-degree reckless
homicide. 48 Van Patten’s plea bargain proceeding was the principal concern
of this case.
Prior to the hearing, Van Patten’s attorney had negotiated a plea bargain
with the local prosecutor that required Van Patten to plead no contest to firstdegree intentional homicide. 49 The plea would also require “a penalty
enhancement for committing the offense while using a dangerous weapon.” 50
Van Patten’s attorney discussed the plea with Van Patten over the telephone
before the hearing. 51 At the hearing, Van Patten’s attorney appeared by
telephone. 52
Van Patten’s attorney’s appearance by telephone instead of in person
was not due to any last-minute problem. 53 Rather, he appeared by telephone
because of the convenience and benefits to the parties involved, including:
“appearances in two other counties that day; that the court was holding time
for Van Patten’s trial; that witnesses were waiting to know whether they
would be needed; and that everyone wanted to get this matter concluded.” 54
Van Patten was not asked whether he had an objection to his attorney’s
absence from court, or if he preferred the hearing to be rescheduled for a day
when his attorney could appear in court. 55
At the hearing, all of the in-court participants huddled around the
speakerphone to allow Van Patten’s attorney to communicate with them. 56
The presiding judge encouraged Van Patten to take his time to speak to his
attorney and stated that the court might be able to provide Van Patten the
46

See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
State v. Van Patten, No. 96-3036-CR, 1997 WL 277952, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 28,
1997).
48
Id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(1).
49
Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1040 (2006).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.; see also Van Patten, 1997 WL 277952, at *1.
53
Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1040.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
47
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opportunity to speak privately over the phone. 57 No private accommodation
was provided nor was a private line set up to allow Van Patten to speak to
his attorney. 58 The court assured Van Patten that the hearing would be on
the record. 59 The court also “quizzed” Van Patten about his constitutional
guarantees and the consequences of pleading instead of going to trial. 60 At
the end of the hearing, the judge accepted Van Patten’s plea and sentenced
him two months later to twenty-five years in prison. 61 Given his sentence,
Van Patten retained other counsel and claimed that the absence of his
attorney at the plea hearing violated his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. 62 Van Patten stated that he felt pressured to accept the plea
because his attorney believed that if he did not plead, he would spend the rest
of his life in prison. 63 Notably, Van Patten stated that he would not have
accepted the plea had his attorney appeared in court in person. 64
2. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin Review of State v. Van Patten
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed Van Patten’s assertion that
his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated when his
attorney appeared at the plea hearing by telephone. 65 The Wisconsin court
applied the Strickland test. 66 In Strickland, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of inadequate representation. The Court formulated a two-prong test to
examine whether the representation of counsel was inadequate enough to
require a judicial remedy. 67 First, there must be a showing that the
performance of counsel was deficient (performance prong). 68 Second, there
must be a showing of prejudice stemming from the deficient performance
(prejudice prong). 69
The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly require that the representation
of counsel is effective. However, the professional standards of the legal

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id.
Id.
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profession implicitly require that lawyers meet certain benchmarks.70 The
Court determined that the effectiveness of counsel is measured by
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 71 Thus, to prove that
counsel was ineffective, a defendant must prove that the “representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 72
Counsel representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding must
advocate for her client’s cause, consult with the defendant about critical
decisions, and communicate with the defendant about the case. 73 More
generally, counsel has a duty to use her education, skills, knowledge, and
expertise to ensure a “reliable adversarial testing process” in all criminal
proceedings. 74 The Court reasoned that the determination of whether counsel
was effective or ineffective could not be an exhaustive checklist of duties and
expectations, but instead involves a reasonable consideration of the
circumstances of each case. 75 The consideration of circumstances is
imperative because the advocacy for and defense of a defendant require that
counsel has the independence to make decisions about case strategy without
being hampered by an artificial measurement of her performance. 76
Additionally, the goal of the Sixth Amendment was not to create a framework
for effective counsel, but instead was to guarantee a fair trial.77 The
guarantee of a fair trial does not necessitate perfect representation from a
perfect lawyer but rather that the quality of the representation is sufficient to
ensure a fair trial.
The Court held that the examination of counsel’s performance by a court
has to be highly deferential. 78 There must be a strong presumption of the
effectiveness of counsel, in which it is presumed that the “conduct fall[s]
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”79 A review of
the effectiveness of counsel has to be specific-fact intensive. This review
requires lower courts to look at the facts of the specific cases as the attorney
saw them at the time of the conduct in question.80 Thus, determining whether
counsel was ineffective cannot be based on what the court believes the
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
Id.
See id. at 688–89.
See id. at 689.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690.
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attorney should have done, but instead on whether the actions were logical
steps taken by a legal professional in preparation for a defense.
The showing of ineffective performance by itself does not necessitate a
court setting aside a conviction. A court must find that the performance of
counsel also prejudiced the defendant’s case. 81 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees a fair trial for the defendant. Even if the defendant’s counsel took
actions that are reasonably ineffective, so long as the overall trial or
proceedings were fair, counsel cannot be deemed so ineffective as to result
in an overturned conviction. 82 The Court reasoned that the finding of
prejudice could not require mere effect on the trial, as that burden would
always be met, nor could it require a showing that counsel’s conduct more
likely than not affected the trial, as that standard would be too high. 83 Instead,
the appropriate test is whether there is “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” 84 “[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial or proceeding. 85 This
requires that courts examine all of the available evidence and determine
whether the attorney’s error rendered a piece of evidence likely to prejudice
the defendant and affect the outcome of the trial. 86
Applying the Strickland test, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
Van Patten’s attorney neither acted outside the standards of reasonable
representation nor prejudiced his client when he appeared by telephone. 87
The court stated that the record did not show that Van Patten was coerced
into entering a plea. 88 The court also concluded that Van Patten did not show
any evidence that his attorney’s performance at the plea hearing was deficient
or that his appearance by itself was so prejudicial as to necessitate
withdrawing the plea. 89 Van Patten appealed the case to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, but the court denied further review, thus letting the Court of
Appeals decision stand. 90

81

Id. at 692.
Id. at 691–92.
83
Id. at 694.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 695–96.
87
State v. Van Patten, No. 96-3036-CR, 1997 WL 277952, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 28,
1997).
88
Id. at *3.
89
Id.
90
State v. Van Patten, 215 Wis. 2d 425 (1997).
82
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3. Federal Review
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court and a reviewing federal district
court agreed with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Van Patten appealed to
the Seventh Circuit. 91 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court
and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 92 The Seventh Circuit held that the
proper standard of review was the standard laid out in United States v.
Cronic. 93 Whereas the Strickland test looks at the actual, fact-specific
performance of counsel to determine her effectiveness, the test in Cronic
attempts to identify scenarios where per se ineffectiveness of counsel is
found.
The Court in Cronic was concerned with the complete breakdown of the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to an adversarial process. 94 The Court framed
the right to effective assistance of counsel as “the right of the accused to
require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing.” 95 This envisioned right does not require that the
defendant’s counsel put on a defense without any errors, but simply that the
defense is adequate enough to provide meaningful prodding of the
prosecution’s case. 96 Whereas under Strickland, an error sufficient to
produce prejudice is essential to prove ineffectiveness of counsel, under
Cronic the defendant needs to prove that the entire adversarial process was
virtually nonexistent. 97
The Court in Cronic attempted to identify sufficient prejudice to the
defendant’s criminal case in order to justify the per se finding of ineffective
representation. The Court explained that a complete denial of counsel—at
the most extreme and obvious—would justify such a per se finding if it
occurred at a critical stage. 98 Likewise, it is justified to find per se
ineffectiveness if counsel fails to test the prosecution’s case through an
adversarial process, such as cross-examination. 99
The Seventh Circuit panel reasoned that Cronic applied instead of
Strickland:
[W]here there has been a complete denial of counsel; where counsel has been prevented
from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the prosecution; where counsel
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See id.; see also Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2006).
Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1038.
Id. at 1041.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1984).
Id. at 656.
See id. at 656–57.
See id. at 656–58.
See id. at 659.
See id.
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entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; or
under circumstances where although counsel is available . . . the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that
a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct[.] 100

To justify the use of the Cronic test, there must be a finding of facts that
make it unlikely that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel
and such a finding then must justify a presumption that the conviction was
unconstitutional. 101
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the appearance of Van Patten’s’
attorney by telephone during the plea hearing made it impossible for Van
Patten to have the assistance of counsel “in anything but the most perfunctory
sense.” 102 Van Patten could not turn to his attorney for advice, ask for
clarifications, be reassured, or discuss any last-minute doubts about the
plea. 103 Additionally, Van Patten’s attorney “could not detect or respond to
cues from his client’s demeanor that might have indicated he did not
understand certain aspects of the proceedings, or that he was changing his
mind.” 104 The court was also concerned with the lack of privacy for Van
Patten and his attorney, especially given that the trial court had not arranged
“a private line in a private place” through which Van Patten and his attorney
could communicate without the court “eavesdropping.” 105
The court stated that Van Patten’s claim was not that his attorney’s
performance was deficient because of inadequate legal judgment or because
he was misinformed about the consequences of a plea.106 Instead, under the
circumstances, Van Patten’s attorney could not see or communicate privately
with Van Patten, which prevented the guaranteed assistance of counsel.107
Quite pointedly, the court stated that counsel’s actual performance could not
be acceptable if her means of appearing deprive the defendant of the full
benefits of her skills at a critical stage of the proceedings. 108 According to
the opinion of the court, no one knows if Van Patten would have taken the
plea had his attorney been in court during the proceeding. 109 It is the presence
of an attorney that ultimately “enable[s] the accused to know all the defenses
100

Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Id. at 1043.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1044.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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available to him and to plead intelligently.” 110 While the court acknowledged
that an attorney appearing by telephone might have been better than no
attorney, “the Sixth Amendment requires more than ‘formal compliance’
with its guarantees.” 111 Thus, allowing an appearance of counsel by
telephone would “treat [the] assistance of counsel as a formality to be
overcome through creative use of technology.” 112
The court reasoned that counsel should be as engaged in the adversarial
process in a plea hearing as she is at a trial because “in both settings, the
accused is confronted with both intricacies of the law and the advocacy of
the public prosecutor.” 113 Even though a plea hearing is not a trial, it should
still be treated “as a confrontation between adversaries.” 114 In addition to the
counsel’s role in the adversarial process, in-person appearances allow courts
to maintain adequate judicial control over the counsel’s performance. 115 If
counsel does not appear in person, the court could miss improper conduct or
fail to create a record sufficient to review counsel’s actual performance. 116
Moreover, the court—even assuming that counsel could hear every word
spoken 117 in court—may not be able to ascertain whether “the defense
attorney was hanging on every word, reading documents in another case,
surfing the web, or falling asleep.” 118
4. The Supreme Court’s Review of Van Patten
The Supreme Court held that in the absence of precedent that squarely
addresses the issue in the case, the decision by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals must stand. 119 The Court asserted that no clear precedent indicated
that the appearance of counsel by telephone “should be treated as a complete
denial of counsel, on par with total absence.” 120 The Court claimed that even
if it acknowledged that the performance of counsel over telephone could lead
to worse performance, it did not necessarily follow that counsel was

110

Id. (quoting White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)).
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
114
Id. at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
115
Id.
116
See id.
117
The court is skeptical that this assumption can even be made given an array of the
technical difficulties that may get in the way. Id.
118
Id.
119
See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2012).
120
Id. at 125.
111
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completely absent, or that counsel could not assist the defendant. 121 “The
question is not whether counsel in those circumstances will perform less well
than he otherwise would, but whether the circumstances are likely to result
in such poor performance that an inquiry into its effect would not be worth
the time.” 122
Given the lack of concrete guidance on the issue by any precedent, the
lack of a clear answer from the proceeding, and the fact that this case was
brought through an AEDPA action, the Court allowed the decision of the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals to stand. 123 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
chose to apply the Strickland test and correctly found that Van Patten did not
assert a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 124 The Court also
pointed out that all the reviewing courts agreed with the assessment that
under Strickland, the defendant had no viable claim. 125
While the Court rendered the decision per curiam, Justice Stevens
authored a short but crucial concurrence. Justice Stevens believed that the
decision rendered in the case was primarily necessary because of a drafting
error in Cronic. 126 That error was the clarification that the presence of
counsel during a critical stage required counsel’s physical presence in
court. 127 In 1984, when Cronic was decided, “neither the parties nor the
Court contemplated representation by attorneys who were not present in the
flesh.” 128 To that end, Stevens believed that the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation in Van Patten v. Deppisch was correct. 129 However, given that
the question for the Court was whether the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was
objectively unreasonable to apply Strickland, the correctness of the Seventh
Circuit was irrelevant. Moreover, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was
justified in concluding that Cronic did not apply to Van Patten’s case because
Cronic clearly referenced a complete denial of counsel or a totally absent
counsel, and it was reasonable to conclude that an appearance by telephone
was not a complete denial or total absence of counsel. 130 Justice Stevens
underscored that the decision of the Court in Wright v. Van Patten neither

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 128.
Id.
See id.

2020]

CAN YOU SEE AND HEAR US, MS. SMITH?

671

adopted the interpretation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals nor that of the
Seventh Circuit. 131
II. ARGUMENTS
The Van Patten case addresses a much narrower set of circumstances
than are possible when considering the use of audio and video conferencing,
namely, who is appearing via video or audio and what type of proceedings
are they engaging in.
In Van Patten, Van Patten’s attorney appeared remotely while Van
Patten was present in court. However, the use of this technology also
presents the possibility that the attorney is physically in the courtroom while
the defendant appears remotely, or that both counsel and defendant appear
by video or audio separately or together. For this Comment, when I refer to
a “Type I” relationship, I am referring to an attorney that is physically in a
courtroom and a defendant that is appearing remotely via video or audio. I
will refer to a relationship like the one in Van Patten, where the defendant
appears in person and his attorney appears remotely, as a “Type II”
relationship. Lastly, a “Type III” relationship is one where both the attorney
and the defendant appear remotely but at different locations, and a “Type IV”
relationship is one where they appear remotely but are in the same location.
Other than the four possible categories of appearances, to fully
appreciate the consequences of using video or audio conferencing, it is
imperative to consider at what point in the judicial process the remote
appearance occurs. More specifically, one must consider at what time the
right to effective assistance of counsel attaches to the defendant, the
implications of that attachment, and the effects of using remote conferencing
at any specific stage of judicial proceedings.
A critical component of analyzing how each stage impacts the use of
video or audio conferencing is how counsel and defendant communicate with
each other. Assuming that communication between counsel and defendant
is fundamental to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel, audio and video conferencing in court poses a variety of problems
for this communication. These problems stem from differences between
when counsel is with the defendant and when she is not. Some of these
problems include: the ability of the defendant to ask a question without
disrupting the court, the ability to speak directly without any possibility of
interference from a poor connection or noise, and the visual cues given by
the defendant to counsel. Some of these problems would be significantly
more problematic if the court used audio conferencing instead of video
131

Id. at 128–29.
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conferencing, or if counsel and defendant are denied a private space to
communicate. Types I, II, and III present the greatest threats to clear and
private communication between counsel and defendant. Type III would
arguably be the worst of the three because both counsel and defendant would
appear via audio or video conferencing. Type IV allows counsel and
defendant to have a relationship that is the same as it would be had they both
physically appeared in court. However, in this scenario, both counsel and the
defendant would be absent from the court.
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IMPACTS THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING AUDIO AND VIDEO
CONFERENCE APPEARANCES

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” 132 The Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the
Confrontation Clause was to:
prevent depositions on ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the [defendant] in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused
has the opportunity, not only of testing recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury, in order that may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand, and the manner in which he
gives his testimony, whether is worth of [belief]. 133

In a later case, the Supreme Court summarized the elements of
confrontation as: physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor. 134 Notably, one of the assurances of the
Confrontation Clause is that a defendant may cross-examine a witness. The
promise that a defendant is guaranteed the right to cross-examine a witness
underscores the role of an effective counsel.
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court examined the implications of
the Confrontation Clause on the use of teleconferencing testimony in cases
where juvenile victims of sexual abuse were allowed to testify against their
abuser. 135 In this case, the Court examined whether the right to confront a
witness face-to-face is absolute. 136 Even though it affirmed its precedent that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant is able to confront a
witness against her face-to-face, the Court held that the guarantee may have
132

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
134
Id. at 846.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 844.
133
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exceptions. 137 The Court reasoned that while its precedent had a preference
for face-to-face confrontation at trial, “a preference must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” 138
The Court held that the right to confront one’s witness may be satisfied absent
a physical presence of the witness “only where denial of such confrontation
is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.” 139
For this Comment, the Confrontation Clause is essential in two respects:
allowing the defendant to exercise (1) her right to confront a witness
testifying against her by effective cross-examination from counsel, and (2)
her right to confront a witness testifying against her face-to-face.
First, the effectiveness of the cross-examination performed by counsel
is most at risk when counsel is not present in court. To that extent, Types II,
III, and IV are most vulnerable to criticism as to the effectiveness of the
performance of counsel. Counsel that appears in court via audio or video
will likely not be able to observe visual cues from a witness, present
evidence, or ask questions that rely on a witness observing documents before
answering a question. In instances where the adversarial process requires
that counsel use her skills to probe the prosecution’s case with the testimony
of an adverse party, the physical absence of counsel will likely impact her
effectiveness. Therefore, during a trial, where it is nearly certain that
witnesses will testify, the absence of an attorney in court is problematic. The
same problem extends to any hearing where a witness may testify, such as a
preliminary hearing. The Type I relationship, therefore, is the least
problematic if the ability to cross-examine is the central concern of the
Confrontation Clause.
If, however, the central concern is the face-to-face confrontation
between the defendant and the witnesses testifying against her, any time the
defendant appears in court via audio or video will create a significant strain
on the ability to fulfill the Confrontation Clause. Every type except Type II
would place a strain on the Confrontation Clause. The strain would be
greater if only audio is used instead of audio and video. But for the same
reasons that the court prefers the physical presence 140 of a witness over
appearance via video, video conferencing is unlikely to resolve the central
problem that the witness and the defendant will not be in the same physical
location.
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 850.
See supra notes 137–139.
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No type of relationship between counsel and defendant via audio or
video conferencing squarely allows the Confrontation Clause to work as
intended in court. Thus, in criminal proceedings where the testimony of a
witness is fundamental, the use of audio and video conferencing should be
scrutinized with care. Type I is the least problematic because it allows
counsel to probe the witnesses’ testimony. It also fulfills one critically
important function of the adversarial process because counsel appears in
court physically. Even though the defendant may not appear in person, her
counsel would still maintain an adversarial process. This type of
arrangement may also be the least offensive to the Confrontation Clause
because it is the defendant that is not in court. Since the right to appear
belongs to the defendant 141 and not the witness, the defendant could appear
via video and have her counsel confront the witness in court with the proper
waiver.
B. THE RISK TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL WITH
APPEARANCE VIA AUDIO AND VIDEO IS REDUCED AT THE
EARLIEST STAGES OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND AFTER A
TRIAL

The right to counsel is not limited to a trial. The right attaches at the
“time . . . or after the initiation of the adversary judicial criminal
proceedings,” 142 or at any “critical stage 143 of the prosecution.” 144 The Kirby
v. Illinois Court was explicit in its characterization that the attachment of the
right to assistance of counsel at the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings
is not merely formalistic. 145 Instead, the initiation of such proceedings is
analytically essential because it represents the commitment of the
141
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(2) (“If defendant waives right to be present, the trial may
proceed to completion . . . during the defendant’s absence.”). By inference, if a defendant can
waive her right to appear physically, a defendant can waive physical appearance while then
appearing via audio or videoconferencing. The appearance via audio and videoconferencing,
unlike a complete absence, still allows the defendant’s involvement in a proceeding. See
generally Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant can implicitly waive his right to
be present by conduct); Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1934) (“[D]efendant [has the
right] to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”).
142
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
143
“The determination whether the hearing is a critical stage requiring the provision of
counsel depends . . . upon an analysis whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s
rights inheres in the confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
144
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.
145
Id. at 689.
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government to bring forth charges against a defendant. 146 From that point,
the defendant is subject to legal procedures that she may not understand and
that may substantively affect her life and liberty.147 The need for counsel to
guide the defendant through the adversarial judicial system implicates the
Sixth Amendment and, more specifically, the right to counsel. 148
The Court in Rothgery v. Gillespie affirmed the decision in Kirby and
clarified the meaning of initiation of judicial criminal proceedings.149 The
start of the criminal proceedings is not marked by the acknowledgment of or
any actions taken by a prosecutor, but instead by the appearance of the
defendant before a judge or magistrate. 150 While the right to counsel attaches
at the beginning of these judicial appearances, counsel need not be present at
the time of attachment.151 Instead, “counsel must [merely] be appointed
within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate presentation
at any critical stage before trial, as well as trial itself.” 152 The attachment of
the right to counsel, then, is separate from the actual presence of counsel
representing a defendant during a judicial proceeding.
The Court in United States v. Wide opined that it was necessary to
“scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the [defendant] to determine whether
the presence of [her] counsel is necessary to preserve [her] basic right to a
fair trial as affected by [her] right . . . to cross-examine . . . and to have
effective assistance of counsel at . . . trial.” 153 This requires careful analysis
of any “substantial prejudice to [a] defendant’s rights . . . in the particular
confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid the prejudice.” 154 The
importance of the right to counsel in a pre-trial proceeding is derived from
the potential adverse effects of pre-trial judicial decisions on the trial itself.155
A defendant cannot be guaranteed a fair trial, even one in which counsel
appears, if the defendant has had to navigate the process leading up to the
trial without any representation.156
Critical stages have a key and outsized role in the analysis of the use of
audio and video conferencing because each stage creates unique
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
See id. at 689–90.
See id.
554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
See id. at 198–99.
See id. at 211–12.
Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 226.
See id. at 226–27.
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circumstances that could make it more or less likely that the use of the
technology passes constitutional muster. The right to effective assistance of
counsel attaches so early in criminal proceedings 157 that it is inherently
difficult to determine whether a court would allow counsel or a defendant to
appear via audio or video by just considering the type of proceeding.
However, examining the general characteristics of proceedings that are
considered critical stages and the level of need for an adversarial process in
each proceeding yields at least some useful guidelines. For example, if there
is no need for cross-examination during a proceeding, the ability of counsel
to maintain an adversarial process is not reduced, per se, just because she
may appear via video or audio. However, as the Seventh Circuit 158
suggested, there may be proceedings like a plea hearing in which the stakes
for the defendant are higher 159 and the need for counsel may be greater even
though cross-examination may not be necessary.
A trial is a type of proceeding where counsel should appear in person
given that the defendant’s freedom and life are at stake at this stage.
Additionally, the need for counsel to appear in person may be stronger in
other proceedings that also impact the freedom of the defendant. For
example, during a plea hearing or sentencing, the impact of the judgment is
more significant than it is during an initial appearance, a status hearing, or
any other pre-trial proceedings as long as no witnesses are testifying. Only
with representation throughout the entire judicial process can the defendant’s
“interests . . . be protected consistently with [an] adversary theory of criminal
prosecution.” 160 At each of the critical stages discussed below, a defendant
is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, but not in all is the presence of
counsel or defendant necessary for the successful protection of the defendant.
The Powell v. Alabama Court stated:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against [a defendant], that
is to say, from the time of [her] arraignment until the beginning of [her] trial, when
consultation, thorough-going investigations and preparations were vitally important,
the defendant[] did not have the aid of counsel . . . although [she was] as much entitled
to such aid during that period as at the trial itself. 161
157

See infra notes 142–152.
Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1038 (2006).
159
At a guilty plea hearing, the defendant admits guilt and her freedom and liberty are at
stake. The defendant effectively allows the state to take away her freedom and liberty without
a trial. There is also a liberty interest during a sentencing hearing because the length of the
sentence matters a great deal to the defendant. Given the sometimes-varying sentencing
guideline ranges, a defendant receiving the lower end of the range is preferable, and only
counsel can fully advocate for the lower range.
160
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
161
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
158
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In Brewer v. Williams, the Court added, “Whatever else it may mean,
the right to counsel . . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of
a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
against [her] whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.” 162
The Court in Coleman v. Alabama held that a defendant is entitled to
counsel even if the initial hearing with a judicial officer is not a requirement
of prosecution under state law. 163 The Court advanced four arguments
buttressing the benefits of having counsel at such a critical stage of
proceedings. First, counsel could expose weaknesses in the state’s case that
would make it unlikely that an indictment is issued at all.164 While the role
of counsel here may seem strong, in practice a defense attorney is unlikely to
convince a prosecutor to drop the charges against a defendant this early in
the process. Thus, even if counsel appeared remotely, it would be highly
unlikely that the remote appearance would have any effect on whether or not
the proceedings continue against the defendant. Second, the Court held that
during the initial hearing, counsel could elicit impeachable testimony from
state witnesses that would testify at trial or preserve useful testimony from
witnesses that may not appear at trial.165 Here, a remote appearance of
counsel may greatly disadvantage a defendant because of the need to crossexamine or probe witnesses. So if the initial hearing does have witnesses,
the need for counsel to appear in person is greater. Nonetheless, it likely does
not rise to the same need as in a trial.
Third, counsel could determine the prosecution’s theory early in the
process and build a defense to address this theory. 166 The formation of a trial
theory is pertinent to how counsel will conduct herself throughout the
adversarial process, but a remote appearance is unlikely to affect counsel’s
understanding of the theory of the case solely because of the lack of physical
presence.
Lastly, the Court held that counsel could more effectively advocate for
necessary testing for trial or advocate for fairer bail for the defendant. 167 The
162

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970). Under Alabama law, the initial hearing serves two purposes.
First, it is to determine whether there is enough evidence for a grand jury to issue an indictment
against the defendant. Second, if the court finds that there is sufficient evidence for a grand
jury to indict and the grand jury does indict, then the hearing also involves the determination
of bail.
164
Id. at 9.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
163
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Court is indeed correct that counsel can advocate for testing and fairer bail,
but there is little indication that physical presence will make it any more
likely that the defendant would receive more testing or a fairer bail.
Similarly, an arraignment is also considered a critical stage. In
Hamilton v. Alabama, the Court held that a defendant is entitled to counsel
during her arraignment. 168 The Court reasoned that the presence of counsel
is necessary to avoid the prejudice of not exercising an available defense
during the arraignment or simply to ensure that the defendant pleads
intelligently after receiving her counsel’s advice. 169 An arraignment is a
critical stage of a judicial proceeding because it can affect the outcome of a
trial. 170 Generally, the need for counsel at this stage is similar to the need
during an initial hearing. Thus, the reduced need for the physical presence
of counsel is comparable in two ways: (1) the remote appearance of counsel
is unlikely to increase the net benefit of their appearance during the
proceedings, and (2) the efficiency created by the possibility of counsel
appearing remotely is strong and compelling. One possible difference is the
need to communicate with and advise the defendant privately. Because a
defendant is generally required to plead guilty or not guilty during the
process, communicating with counsel is a significant consideration that is
impacted regardless of whether the defendant or counsel appears via video
or audio. At this stage, if both counsel and defendant are together and appear
via audio or video, then the communication consideration is unnecessary
because counsel and defendant can communicate freely.
Initial hearings and arraignments are perfect examples of proceedings
where the use of video or audio conferencing may bring efficiency to the
judicial process. Given the nature of initial hearings and arraignments—
attorneys cannot predict when someone will get arrested or formally
indicted—having the flexibility to have counsel appear from anywhere, at
any time, to represent a defendant during these stages is a net benefit for the
judicial process and defendants.
Other than the trial, the process of negotiation and entry of guilty pleas
and sentencing represent stages where the expertise and skills of counsel
greatly impact the defendant. As such, the need for the physical presence of
counsel is likely greater than it is for initial proceedings.

168
169
170

368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961).
Id.
Id. at 54.
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The Court has implicitly held that a defendant is entitled to counsel
during the negotiation or entry of a guilty plea. 171 In examining the
effectiveness of counsel pertaining to plea bargains, the Court showed that it
had determined that plea proceedings entitle defendants to the right to
counsel. If the Court had determined that plea bargains were noncritical
stages of judicial proceedings, then it would not have examined the
effectiveness of counsel in relation to the plea proceedings. The Court has
also found that a defendant is entitled to counsel during sentencing
proceedings for both capital and noncapital cases because the length of a
defendant’s sentence is at stake. 172 “Even though sentencing does not
concern the defendant’s guilt or innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel
during a sentencing hearing can result in [] prejudice because any amount of
additional jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.” 173
Both the negotiation and entry of a guilty plea and sentencing require a
sophisticated level of communication from counsel. Informing a defendant
about the consequences of a guilty plea is of the utmost importance for the
defendant and the fairness of the judicial system. All precautions should be
taken to ensure that counsel can communicate with her client about the
expected outcomes of the guilty plea, whether they impact the appeals
process or the years served in prison. The same is true during the sentencing
process. Communication between counsel and defendant is a significant
component of what occurs during these two stages, and therefore the remote
appearance of either counsel or defendant should be scrutinized.
Critical stages are not limited to pre-trial and trial proceedings. A
defendant is entitled to representation by counsel at her appeal because a
layperson is generally not equipped to present an appeal case effectively. The
process is a “perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond the
competence of individuals . . . who have little education, learning

171

See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012) (“[R]espondent has shown that but for
counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability he and the trial court would
have accepted the guilty plea.”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010) (“The
consequences of [the defendant’s] plea could easily be determined from reading the removal
statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was
incorrect.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S 759, 770 (1970) (“In our view a defendant’s
plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack
on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s
confession.”).
172
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165.
173
Id. (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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disabilities, and mental impairments.” 174 At this stage, the need for counsel
to be physically present may be critically important because of counsel’s
relationship with the court. During an appellate argument, counsel would be
in a better position to react and respond to questions from the court and the
opposing side. Even though this stage is of great importance to the defendant,
the defendant’s communication with counsel during the process is reduced
because of the nature of the proceedings. Appellate proceedings are about
legal arguments and exposing errors in judgment during the trial process.
Therefore, the defendant’s presence is less important to the outcome of the
proceeding. In these types of proceedings, having the defendant appear via
video or audio from prison would likely be acceptable without any major
effect on the effectiveness of counsel because of the remote appearance.
Moreover, at this stage, the defendant will not confront any witnesses as she
would have in prior stages.
Finally, the right to effective counsel in probation and parole
proceedings is not a guaranteed right, but instead a case-by-case
determination that depends on the circumstances and seriousness of the
revocation. 175 “[C]ertain cases in which fundamental fairness [is] the
touchstone of due process . . . will require the state [to] provide at its expense
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.” 176 The Court did not attempt
to formulate a manner in which officials could determine the necessity of
counsel for probation and parole revocation. 177 Since these two proceedings
require a case-by-case determination as to whether counsel is guaranteed, the
ability of counsel or defendant to appear remotely is less likely to be
problematic. While the need for communication between counsel and
defendant is strong, the concern that the freedom of the defendant is at stake
is reduced. Regardless of whether the defendant is paroled or on probation,
she is still under the custody or care of the state. The overall stake of losing
one’s freedom is not the same here as it is before and during a trial, a guilty
plea, or the sentencing process.

174
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005). “Michigan’s very procedure for
seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea, moreover, may intimidate the uncounseled.”
Id. at 622.
175
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
176
Id.
177
Id.
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C. NEITHER STRICKLAND NOR CRONIC CAN ADEQUATELY ASSESS
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL WHEN CONSIDERING
AUDIO AND VIDEO CONFERENCING

Testing a counsel-defendant relationship using the Strickland test is a
fact-specific exercise. Thus, appearing by video or audio by itself would not
lead to an overturned conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Instead, the court would have to find that the attorney’s performance via
video or audio was unreasonable and that the performance prejudiced the
defendant. The likelihood that a court could find a lackluster performance
and prejudice is higher for Types II, III, and IV, where counsel would not be
physically present in court. However, a likely increase in possibility hardly
makes it overall more likely that a court would find ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court would have to examine, for example, the need to crossexamine, the type of proceeding, and the ease or availability of
communication between the defendant and her counsel. The performance of
an attorney may be found to be substandard over video or audio if counsel
was not able to cross-examine a witness thoroughly during a proceeding
where cross-examination is a component. Substandard performance could
also be found if an unstable connection prevented counsel and defendant
from communicating about the proceedings in real time as in a plea
bargaining setting or sentencing. Yet the Strickland test as currently applied
does little to consider that there are real differences in how counsel fulfills
her duties depending on whether she appears remotely or in person. Thus,
the Strickland test generally seems to underestimate the possible
repercussions of an attorney who is not present in court.
In contrast, under the construction of Cronic presented by Justice
Stevens and the Seventh Circuit, it is hard to imagine that counsel appearing
via video or audio would ever survive constitutional muster. To that extent,
the Cronic test has the opposite flaw of Strickland—it overestimates the
impact of counsel appearing remotely instead of in person.
Under Cronic, Types II, III, and IV would likely be unconstitutional
because counsel does not physically appear in court. Type I may survive
Cronic, but both Stevens and the Seventh Circuit suggested that the
requirement that counsel appear in court physically also means that counsel
appears in court physically alongside her client. Justice Stevens claimed that
the Seventh Circuit “assumed that the constitutional right at stake was the
right to have counsel by one’s side at all critical stages of the proceeding”
and presence of counsel meant physical presence in court.178 If that holds
true, even a Type I relationship may be struck down because the defendant
178
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does not get the benefit of being physically next to her counsel, including the
benefit of communicating about the proceedings. Under this construction,
counsel’s presence in court does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee
in itself because the defendant does not get the benefit of counsel next to her.
If the Court determines that counsel appearing via video or audio results in
per se ineffective assistance of counsel, then it would inadequately adapt to
the ever-increasing use of technology in courts. That type of decision would
foreclose the application of technology in all proceedings that entitle or could
entitle a defendant to assistance of counsel. As discussed in the previous
subsection, not every judicial proceeding presents unequivocally harmful
effects on counsel or the defendant appearing in court via video or audio
conference.
Alternatively, the Court should find that the test in Cronic is broader
than the one recognized by Justice Stevens and the Seventh Circuit. This test
would allow a broader interpretation of the presence requirement to
encompass both a physical presence and a presence in mind. A broader
interpretation of Cronic would be more consistent with the language that only
finds per se ineffectiveness of counsel if there is a complete denial or absence
of counsel. 179
If courts simply examine whether there was a complete denial or
absence of counsel, then appearance via audio or video conference would
likely not be deemed per se ineffective because the defendant was
represented by counsel. While this may be a satisfactory result because it
allows representation that involves audio and video conferencing, it tends to
oversimplify the issue. While the result of the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation is unsatisfactory, the court’s concern that it would lack
oversight over an attorney appearing via audio and video is valid. One way
to remedy this concern is to have the reviewing court determine if the counsel
appearing via audio and video conferencing appears engaged in the
proceeding, i.e. if she is present in mind. If the court finds that counsel was
engaged in the proceeding, actively probed the prosecution’s case, and was,
in general, aware and responsive to the proceedings, then it cannot find a per
se ineffectiveness. This type of first step would allow courts to acknowledge
that the appearance via video or audio is partially different from an in-person
appearance, but not such that courts necessarily need either an automatic
finding of a per se ineffectiveness or direct examination under Strickland. If
the Court did find that the first step was satisfied, namely that counsel who
appeared remotely was at least present in mind, then an application of
Strickland as a second step would complete the analysis.
179
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CONCLUSION
It is inevitable that courts will increasingly utilize technology during the
judicial process. The ability of courts to have counsel and defendant appear
remotely offers greater flexibility for courts and shows promising
efficiencies. However, courts do not operate outside the restrictions
prescribed by the Constitution. The fairness of the criminal justice system is
dependent on constitutional guarantees that should not be lessened in the
name of the efficiency or flexibility without careful consideration and
without taking the necessary precautions to preserve the full scope and
efficacy of these guarantees. Audio and video conferencing can improve the
criminal justice system as long as defendants can depend on the
uncompromising right to effective representation. To that end, courts should
define the constitutional parameters of remote appearances. Without
concrete guidance and a decision on the merits from the Supreme Court, more
questions remain than are answered. This Comment has attempted to
propose ways that courts could analyze the effect of remote appearances on
the right to effective counsel. It has also provided several considerations in
that analysis.
Twenty-first-century courtrooms may be significantly different from
their eighteenth century counterparts, but the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution in criminal proceedings remain constant. The inherent
challenge is to find the precise limit of an administration of justice that is able
to continuously adapt to technological advances in a manner that still
conforms to the Constitution.
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